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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Respondents (hereafter Employer) do not disagree with the Statement of the Case set
forth in Appellant's (hereafter Claimant) Opening Brief.
II.

ISSUE

Whether there is substantial, competent evidence to support the Commission's finding
that Claimant's automobile accident injuries did not arise out of and in the course of her
employment.
III.

ARGUMENT

SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The determination of whether a particular injury arose out of and m the course of
employment is a question of fact for the Commission. See Neufeld v. Browning Ferris Industries,
109 Idaho 899, 902, 712 P.2d 600, 603 (1985).
This Court succinctly summarized the appellate standard of review as follows:
In reviewing a decision of the Commission, this Court exercises free review over
the Commission's legal conclusions. When doing so, this Court "must liberally
construe the provisions of the worker's compensation law in favor of the
employee, in order to serve the humane purposes for which the law was
promulgated." However, we limit our review to determining whether the
Commission correctly denied benefits after it applied the law to the relevant facts.
Id. The Commission's findings of fact will not be disturbed so long as they are
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Substantial and competent
evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion." The Commission's findings regarding the weight and credibility of
the evidence will not be disturbed so long as they are not clearly erroneous. This
Court does not re-weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have reached a
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different conclusion from the evidence presented. Rather, we must view all facts
and inferences in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the
Commission.

Clark's v. Shari's Management Corp., 155 Idaho 576, 579, 314 P.3d 631, 634 (2013) (internal
cites omitted).
This Court further stated:
[t]he substantial evidence rule is said to be a middle position which precludes a de
novo hearing but which nonetheless requires a serious review which goes beyond
the mere ascertainment of procedural regularity.
Such a review requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the
agency's determination, though something less than the weight of the evidence.
Put simply ... the substantial [competent] evidence rule requires a court to
determine whether the agency's findings of fact are reasonable.

Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985)
(internal cites omitted).
1. The fact that there was an intervening, independent cause of in.iury is relevant

evidence which reasonable minds might accept to support the conclusion that
Claimant's automobile accident injuries were not the result of an accident arising
out of and in the course of her employment

To be compensable under Idaho law, an injury must be the result of an accident arising

out of and in the course of employment. Idaho Code Section 72-102(18)(a). An injury is
received in the course of employment when it comes while Claimant is doing the duty which she
is employed to perform. See Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 6, 235 P.2d 736, 738-39
(1951 ). It arises out of the employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind upon
consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which
the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. See id.
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Claimant invites this Court to greatly expand the circumstances under which an injury
will be covered by encouraging adoption of the compensable consequence doctrine, set forth in
Professor Larson's treatise, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law:
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an aggravation of the original
injury or a new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is the direct and natural
result of a compensable primary injury.
1 Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 10.0 I (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.
2014).
Apparently in an effort to address those situations (such as this case) in which a second
injury clearly did not arise out of and in the course of employment, Professor Larson created a
concept which he called "quasi-course of employment":
[s]ince in the strict sense, none of the consequential injuries we are concerned
with are in the course of employment, it becomes necessary to contrive a new
concept, which we may for convenience call "quasi-course of employment." By
this expression is meant activities undertaken by the employee following upon his
or her injury which, although they take place outside the time and space limits of
the employment, and would not be considered employment activities for the usual
purposes, are nevertheless related to the employment in the sense that they are
necessary or reasonable activities that would not have been undertaken but for the
compensable iajury.
Id. at§ 10.05.

In circumstances such as those presented by this case, neither the Industrial Commission
nor the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho has formally adopted Professor Larson's
compensable consequence doctrine, or his "quasi-course of employment" theory.
This Court previously rejected the notion that an automobile accident occurring while
claimant was traveling to or from medical treatment would be a loss covered under the workers'
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compensation laws of this state. See Kiger v. The Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d
208 (1963). In Kiger, the claimant was injured in an automobile accident while driving to her
doctor's office for treatment of her industrial injury. In denying her benefits, the Kiger Court
quoted from the Oklahoma decision of Farmers' Gin Co. v. Cooper, 147 Ok!. 29. 294 P. 108
( 1930), stating the automobile accident "was in no sense due to the employment, nor did it result
from a risk reasonably incident to the employment and there is a severance rather than a causal
connection between the conditions under which the work was required to be performed and the
resulting injury." Kiger, 85 Idaho at 430.
The Kiger Court referred to a previous decision in which it reiterated, "that if there
occurs, after the initial accident and injury, an intervening, independent, responsible, and
culminating cause, the latter occurrence becomes the proximate cause." Id. (citing Linder v. City
of Payette, 64 Idaho 656, 135 P.2d 440 (1943)).
The Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho has never applied the compensable
consequences doctrine to circumstances (such as this) in which there is an intervening cause
between the initial injury and the latter injury. The Commission has only done so in
circumstances in which the second injury is directly and causally tied to the initial compensable
mJury.
For example, in Castaneda v. Idaho Home Health Inc., 1999 IIC 0857, 0862 (July 1999),
the Commission found the claimant's right elbow epicondylitis resulted from her inability to
properly use her right arm after she broke her right shoulder in an industrial accident, and was
therefore compensable. Likewise, in Schafer v. Smith Group International, 2006 IIC 0120
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(February 2006), the Commission found that an overuse injury of the left arm resulted from
right-hand carpal tunnel industrial injury and was compensable. In Nelson v. First Interstate

Bank, 2000 IIC 0914, the Commission found the overuse syndrome in claimant's right shoulder
to be the result of compensable left shoulder injury. In Quenton, 2003 IIC 0244 (2003) the
Commission determined that left leg deep thrombosis from inactivity was compensable
following a compensable right leg injury. In short, when the Industrial Commission has applied
the compensable consequences doctrine, it has done so in cases in cases in which there was a
direct causal link between the original industrial injury and the subsequent injury or condition.
In the present case, there is no direct causal connection between the industrial injury and
the subsequent injuries suffered in the automobile accident. The nature of the first injury is not
directly related to the onset of the second injury. To apply the compensable consequence
doctrine to these facts would greatly expand the scope of compensable injuries under Idaho's
workers' compensation law.
Because there was an intervening, independent cause of injury, the Commission properly
concluded that Claimant's automobile accident injuries were not the result of an accident arising
out of and in the course of her employment.
2. Under similar facts, the compensable consequences doctrine is expressly rejected
in other jurisdictions

Courts of other jurisdictions, following the reasoning of Kiger and Linder, have denied
compensation under similar facts. For example, in Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation

Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1997), a case which is almost factually identical to the
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present case, the injured employee was killed in a car accident while returning from a medical
appointment when her vehicle slid on ice and rolled. As is the case here, the employee:
•

had previously suffered an undisputed workplace injury;

•

was awarded benefits for that injury, including medical benefits;

•

was returning from a medical appointment in connection with treatment and care required
for the workplace injury;

•

had been required to travel some distance (out of state) to seek required care, and was
paid for the travel;

•

was injured while proceeding directly home from her appointment, without evidence of
diverting on an errand or any other activity unrelated to her appointment;

•

was not driving negligently at the time of the accident.

See id. at 374-75.
The Hearing Examiner, apparently following Professor Larson's lead, found that the
death was compensable because the death could be theoretically linked to the injury. See id. at
377.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming found that the " ... linkage between the
compensable injury and the travel is direct and unbroken." Id. at 375. The Court was presented
with the question of whether the heirs of the employee were entitled to benefits under a
Wyoming statute which mandated death benefits "if an injured employee dies as a result of a
work related injury ... [.]" Id.

6

The Court found that the death statute at issue provided broader protections than other
workplace injuries not resulting in death. The Court wrote, " ... the language 'as a result of' is
broader than the concept of 'proximate cause[.]' The Legislature chose this language for a
reason, and that reason must be because death benefits were not intended to be restricted only to
families of those whose deaths were immediately, solely, primarily, or proximately caused by
industrial accidents." Id. at 376.
Even with broader protections, the comi reversed the hearing examiner, finding that in
order for death to be compensable, the initial injury must be the direct cause of the employee's
death. See id. at 377. The court's reasoning is particularly instructive here, and therefore will be
quoted at length:
As the division points out, it would be impossible to ever cut off compensability if
we were to adopt the hearing examiner's interpretation of the causation
requirement. Would we compensate an employee who wrecked her car and died
because she fell asleep at the wheel while she was on her way to see her doctor?
Would we compensate an employee who was killed by a drunk driver while she
was on her way home from her doctor's appointment? A logical end would not
exist to the causation test which the hearing examiner proposes. Furthermore, it
would lead to too many abuses, and the worker's compensation fund would, in
effect, become a general health and accident insurance fund, a purpose for which
it was not intended.
A causal connection does not exist between the employee's initial injury and her
car accident. The fact that she was returning from a doctor's appointment for an
injury which she sustained while she was working ... does not translate to a
finding that the injury caused her death. Certainly, the accident which caused the
employee's death did not occur because of her work related back injury. The
accident was not a hazard of her employment that she would not have been
subjected to apart from her job nor did it result from a risk reasonably incident to
the character of the business. Rather, the accident resulted from a hazard that we
are all equally exposed to - bad road conditions.
Id. at 377-78 (emphasis added).
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The Bruhn Court also examined, and expressly rejected, the concept of quasi-course of
employment; instead, it held that in order for a second injury to be compensable, the original
compensable injury must be a direct cause of the subsequent injury. See id. at 378.
Under similar facts, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Mackin & Assoc. v. Harris, 672
A.2d 1110 (Md. 1996), considered and rejected application of compensable consequences. The
Mackin Court reversed a lower court ruling granting workers' compensation benefits for an

injury that occurred when claimant slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk while making his way to
his physical therapist's office for treatment for an industrial injury. In reversing, the court found
there was insufficient legal nexus between the industrial injury and the slip and fall to warrant
additional compensation. See ~Mackin, 672 A.2d at 115.
Claimant encourages the outright adoption of Professor Larson's compensable
consequences doctrine. Thus, the Mackin Court's lengthy consideration (and criticism) of
Professor Larson's approach is particularly instructive here, as it examines the limitless
circumstances in which benefits would be awarded applying the doctrine:
Professor Larson's approach to causation in consequential injury cases appears to
rely heavily, if not almost exclusively, on the "but for" test; but for the first injury
and the need for treatment therefor, would the second accident have occurred?
The "but for" test has some value in the determination of causation. If a set of
facts cannot pass the "but for" test, causation in fact is ruled out. The converse is
not true-if a fact situation passes the "but for" test, the requisite causation is not
necessarily established. That is so because the literal application of the "but for"
test may fail to exclude causation links that are metaphysically conceivable but
practically and legally absurd. But for the fact that the negligence of Driver A in
blocking an intersection caused Driver B to be delayed two minutes, Driver B
would not have arrived at a subsequent intersection two miles away when he did,
and would not have collided with Driver C at that intersection. But for the fact
that an employee is injured on the job and temporarily disabled, he would not
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have been at home on a normal work day and would not have fallen down his
cellar stairs, tripped on a garden hose, etc. These illustrations may pass the "but
for" test, but causation in any meaningful sense, whether in the context of tort law
or workers' compensation law, is simply not present.

This expansive view of causation, which invokes the necessity to "contrive" the
legal fiction of "quasi-course of employment" or to find implicit conditions of
employment, leads to rather extraordinary results. Professor Larson suggests, for
example, that a claimant injured by taking the wrong bottle from his medicine
cabinet while endeavoring to take aspirin for a compensable injury should be
entitled to compensation benefits for ingesting the wrong medicine:
If the employee fault is simple negligence, as in carelessly taking
bichloride of mercury tablets by mistake for aspirin although the
bottle was plainly marked 'Poison,' under this test the subsequent
injury would be compensable, and this seems to be the right result.
Larson,§ 13.1 l(d).

Presumably, the expanded concept of causation would also afford compensation if
the claimant twisted his back while reaching for the medicine, or was injured
while going to and from a drug store to obtain medicine. In Dept. of Transp. v.
King, 554 So.2d 1192 (Fla.App.1989), review denied, 563 So.2d 631 (1990), a
pedestrian injured by a car that jumped a median after colliding with another car
was awarded compensation benefits because at the time of the accident she was
taking a walk and had been instructed by her physician to take walks to aid the
healing of an industrial injury to her leg. In Little Caesar's Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572
So.2d 8 (Fla.App.1990), an off-duty claimant was involved in an automobile
accident while returning from a park where he had been swimming. He claimed
compensation benefits for injuries sustained in the automobile accident on the
ground that his doctor had recommended swimming as an appropriate exercise to
recover his strength after an earlier work related injury. The court awarded
compensation benefits, holding that the claimant's injuries were within the chain
of causation started by the industrial accident. These holdings are not consistent
with our view of the causal relationship required to support a compensation claim
for consequential injuries.

Id. at 1113-14 (emphasis added).
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Likewise, in Carlson v. Young, 171 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio 1959), the employee was required
to submit to a medical examination, and while in route was injured in a bus accident. In
affirming the lower court's denial of benefits due to injuries caused by the bus accident, the Ohio
Court of Appeals stated:
If the intervening cause was wholly responsible for the final result, then no
liability attaches to the previous injury. To create liability, the disability suffered
must be the consequence of a continuous chain of causation so connected that the
act or force complained of is carried through from the employment to the accident
to the injury and to the disability. If an intervening independent agency breaks
the chain of causation so as to destroy the original force, the employer is relieved
from injuries following the termination of the force which the employment set in
motion.

Id. at 738-39 (quoting from Scheider on Workmen's Compensation, v. 6, § 543(£), p. 53). (See

also Rucker v. Michigan Smelting & Refining Co., 300 Mich. 668, 2 NW2d 808 (1942); Dean v.
Chrysler Corp., 434 Mich. 655, 455 NW2d 699 (1990)).

IV.

CONCLUSION

It has been widely observed that "bad facts create bad law." The undersigned asserts that
a more accurate statement would be "difficult facts create bad law." This case presents just such
difficult facts

Claimant was required to attend an independent medical evaluation some

distance from her home at a time of year when road hazards were possible, and was injured
through no fault of her own due to those road hazards while returning from the appointment. R.,
9-11.

It is difficult under such circumstances not to sympathize with Claimant, and perhaps it is
tempting to assign the risk of such travel to the Employer. However tempting it might be,
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Claimant's arguments run contrary to and seek to overrule a valid decision of this Court on point.
An extreme case such as this is a poor basis for a broad precedent which would cover unlimited
less extreme circumstances. There is no required legal nexus between Claimant's industrial
injury and the injuries suffered in the automobile accident. Idaho has not adopted the "quasicourse of employment rule" suggested by Professor Larson.
For the foregoing reasons, the Employer and Surety respectfully petition the Court to
uphold the Commission's finding that Claimant's motor vehicle collision was an intervening,
independent, responsible, and culminating cause, and therefore the proximate cause of the
injuries resulting from the collision. Therefore, Claimant must be denied benefits associated
with those injuries.
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